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How Culture Comes to Mind: From Social Affordances to 
Cultural Analogies 
Laurence Kaufmann & Fabrice Clément 
« L’anthropologie, même sociale, se proclame solidaire de 
l’anthropologie physique, dont elle guette les découvertes avec une 
sorte d'avidité. Car même si les phénomènes sociaux doivent être 
provisoirement isolés du reste et traités comme s’ils relevaient d'un 
niveau spécifique, nous savons bien qu’en fait et même en droit 
l’émergence de la culture restera pour l’homme un mystère tant qu’il 
ne parviendra pas à déterminer, au niveau biologique, les modifica-
tions de structure et de fonctionnement du cerveau, dont la culture a 
été simultanément le résultat naturel et le mode d’appréhension »  
Claude Lévi-Strauss, Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France, 1960 
RESUME : Comment la culture vient à l'esprit. Des affordances sociales aux 
analogies culturelles. Jusqu’à présent, les tentatives naturalistes visant à rendre 
compte des phénomènes culturels ont eu tendance à les appréhender comme des 
représentations qui se diffusent dans la population grâce à leurs propriétés contre-
intuitives, qui retiennent l’attention et facilitent la mémorisation individuelle. En 
complément à cette perspective, qui présuppose une forme de distanciation cognitive 
entre les individus et leur culture, cet article propose un modèle naturaliste qui prend 
acte de la forte implication cognitive et de la posture, non pas contemplative mais 
participative, que provoquent bon nombre de phénomènes culturels. Un tel modèle 
tente de défendre une «vision continuiste» du lien entre nature et culture en remettant 
partiellement en question la focalisation traditionnelle des sciences sociales sur la 
dimension artificielle et arbitraire des faits sociaux. Pour les auteurs, en effet, cette 
focalisation ne rend pas compte de la naturalité et de l’universalité d’un certain 
nombre de formes sociales élémentaires. Une fois posée la naturalité partielle du 
social, l’objectif est alors de rendre compte de l’émergence des phénomènes culturels. 
L’hypothèse défendue ici est que les capacités analogiques, elles aussi naturelles, qui 
permettent aux esprits humains de «dériver» les formes culturelles du monde de la 
nature, qu’il soit physique ou social, jouent un rôle central dans l’élaboration d’une 
sphère de l’expérience collective qui est tout à la fois culturelle et intuitive. 
MOTS-CLE : Analogie, culture, cognition, forme sociale, naturalisme, affordance, 
idéologie. 
ABSTRACT: Until now, the naturalist attempts to account for cultural phenomena have 
tended to see them as representations that spread within the population thanks to the 
counterintuitive properties making them salient and easy to remember. As a 
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supplement to this view, which postulates a kind of cognitive distance between 
individuals and culture, this paper proposes a naturalist model that takes into 
consideration the strong cognitive involvement and the participative rather than 
contemplative stance triggered by a good many cultural phenomena. Such a model 
tries to defend a «continuist view» of the link between nature and culture by calling 
partially into question the traditional emphasis of social sciences on the artificial, 
arbitrary dimension of social facts. For the authors, indeed, this emphasis does not 
account for the naturality and universality of a certain number of elementary social 
forms. Once the partial naturality of the social is asserted, the purpose is to describe 
the emergence of cultural phenomena. The hypothesis put forward here is that 
analogical capacities, also natural, which allow human minds to «draw» cultural 
forms from the world of nature, either physical or social, play a central role in the 
elaboration of a sphere of collective experience that is both cultural and intuitive.  
KEY WORDS: Analogy, culture, cognition, social form, naturalism, affordance, 
ideology 
INTRODUCTION1 
For most anthropologists, culture covers different kinds of phenomena, 
ranging from habits to institutions. Culture, as Edward Tylor put it, “is a com-
plex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” 
(Tylor, 1958, p. 1). Far from the evolutionary definition of culture as well-
adaptative information transmitted through nongenetic means among members 
of a group (Boesch & Tomasello, 1998), the anthropological view of culture 
sees variation as going beyond anything that might arise from the course of 
biological evolution (Carrithers, 1997, p. 99). Cultural anthropology, in par-
ticular, insists on the “superorganic” dimension of culture and on the 
complexity of representational, human-specific creations (i.e. myths, rituals, 
symbols). This being so, such emphasis on cultural variation as the main char-
acteristic of socio-cultural phenomena is not shared by all anthropological 
perspectives (for a review, see Atran et al., 2005). Contrary to cultural anthro-
pology, indeed, social anthropology, which dwells on the social dimensions of 
human groupings (i.e. kinship, political organization, economic exchange), 
tends to emphasize the organizational aspects of the socio-cultural phenomena 
that are recurrent – not to say universal – in any society.  
In this paper, we will try to give a naturalistic twist to those two different 
anthropological perspectives by defending a type of moderate naturalism that 
preserves both ontological and cognitive continuity between nature and culture 
as far as possible. To do so, we will call into question the automatic associa-
tion, shared by both naturalist and culturalist views of culture, between natural 
and material on the one hand, and cultural and arbitrary on the other hand. In 
fact, in the radical naturalist view, culture is mostly regarded as an epiphe-
nomenal, counterintuitive set of discrete representational contents, isolated 
from one another, and characterized by their intrinsic properties – mainly sys-
tematic violation of hard-wired expectations about object boundaries and 
movements (naive physics), species configurations and relationships (naive 
biology), and goal-directed and interactive behavior (naive psychology) 
                                                 
1This project was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). Some aspects of this 
work have benefited from insightful discussions with Lawrence Hirschfeld, with whom our reflections 
on the role of analogy-making in culture have started. His ideas on naive sociology have also been 
decisive on our own line of reasoning on this matter.  
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(Sperber, 1975, 1996; Boyer, 1994; Atran, 2001). In the radical culturalist 
view, by contrast, culture is seen as a floating shared system of symbols, that 
is, a system of immaterial, artificial signs which is characterized by its arbi-
trariness and its independence from lower-level phenomena (Geertz, 1973; 
Clifford, 2002). Our working hypothesis goes partially counter to those pre-
dominant views, since it postulates that culture is certainly artificial but not 
necessarily arbitrary or counterintuitive. Instead of insisting on the arbitrariness 
of culture, which leads to an increasing of the gap between natural mechanisms 
and sociocultural constructs, the moderate naturalism that we want to propose 
tries to integrate them into an ontological and epistemological continuum. On 
the ontological side, indeed, the gap between nature and culture decreases in a 
significant way if we consider cultural objects to supervene, at least to a certain 
extent, upon invariant, elementary social forms that are characterized by their 
tangibility and universality (Kaufmann & Clément, 2003). On the epistemo-
logical side, the cognitive discontinuity between two impervious layers of 
cognition, that is, intuitive, experiential cognition and symbolic, ideological 
cognition, partly yields to cognitive continuity if we consider the bridge-
building work of analogical mappings.  
The somewhat risky challenge that we want to take up in this paper is to 
argue in favor of this twofold hypothesis. In the first step, we will adopt as our 
own the emphasis of social anthropology on the invariant features of social 
groupings while making it compatible with the long-term evolution of social 
species (part I). From the point of view of social naturalism that we want to 
defend here, social forms are indeed considered as cross-cultural saliencies that 
stand out in the experiential, perceptual and action fields of any well-adapted, 
evolved social organism. In the second step, we will try to take into account, 
along the same lines as cultural anthropology, human-specific creativity by 
hypothesizing the existence of a socio-cognitive mechanism, namely analogy-
making, which contributes to the creation and maintenance of the symbolic 
components of culture (part II). Insofar as analogies refer both to a specific 
kind of cognitive processing and to typical items of human culture, they play a 
central role in our naturalist framework. 
I. ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
FACTS  
 A moderate naturalism 
The moderate naturalism we want to advocate here defends the autonomy 
of social facts while carving out a place for them in the natural world. Such a 
modest naturalism has three main characteristics. First, it gives up determining 
once and for all the ontological unit of culture, whether it be infra-intentional 
states, voluntary acts, social relationships or symbolic contents, and accepts the 
integration of different levels of description within the same naturalistic 
framework. Therefore, the naturalist framework we want to propose does not 
involve reductionism, that is, the a priori principle that everything in nature 
can be reduced to the ultimate constituents of matter. As Mayr (2004) put it, 
adopting an analytical method in order to identify the fundamental elements of 
a system is different from the reductionist claim that those very elementary 
units do explain the system as a whole. Second, in line with social naturalism 
as initiated by George Mead, Erving Goffman and John Dewey and recently 
discussed by contemporary sociologists (Quéré, 2001, 2002; Conein, 2001; 
Céfaï, 2001), it assumes that social theorizing should be grounded in methods 
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of inquiry continuous with those successful in the natural sciences, mainly 
observational methods. Last but not least, this moderate naturalism denies the 
relevance of what we could call, by analogy with the well-known mind-body 
problem, the mind-culture problem that haunts both strong naturalism and 
culturalism: is it mind that causes culture or culture that causes mind? In fact, 
such mind-culture framing is misleading: it supposes that efficient causation is 
the only remaining ontological link able to prevent cultural phenomena from an 
autonomization that would be synonymous with a parallel, immaterial world. 
Traditionally, the paradigm of efficient causation is that of billiard balls; a 
billiard ball provokes the movement and hence the trajectory of another one by 
bumping into it. The causal link connecting the antecedent and consequent 
events is physical and implies the existence of two a priori separated entities, 
in this case two billiard balls. When applied to the link between mind and cul-
ture, this “push-pull” framing has counterproductive implications: it considers 
mind and culture as empirical entities, a priori separated by a gap that must be 
filled in by some ontological glue, namely physical causation. Now from an 
evolutionary point of view, it does not make much sense to draw an external, 
causal relationship between mind and culture: rather, within the ecological 
niche they are both part of, they are related by the internal connection, the 
“generic ontological dependence” that characterizes, as Esfeld (1998, p. 367) 
put it, the parts or the levels of a given holistic system. From this “ecological” 
perspective, the supposedly mind-culture causal link yields to an internal rela-
tionship between what we could consider as two different levels of the same 
“mind”. (1) The basic-level, pre-wired mind on which cognitive science is 
focused is the site of the organized set of universal cognitive devices that 
evolved as an adaptation to the specific challenges presented by the ancestral 
environment (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999). (2) The 
high-level, sophisticated and human-specific mind on which social sciences 
dwell is a web of impersonal public meanings, concepts and rules, i.e. the 
“objective spirit” that Descombes (1996) speaks of.  
As will be seen, one of the main difficulties is to specify how cognitive and 
cultural minds are related. Whereas counterintuitive models of culture tend to 
portray a two-layer, “split mind” that draws an impervious boundary between 
the cognitive primacy of basic-level experiences and well-controlled situated 
cultural evocations, our model emphasizes its intuitive counterpart by shedding 
light on the analogical connections which might bridge the gap between cogni-
tion and culture. 
From cognition to culture 
There is a tendency in contemporary cognitive science to think that natural 
selection gave priority to domain-specific information and learning processing 
over domain-general mechanisms, which are too costly in terms of time and 
energy (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). From this evolutionary perspective, human 
learners have pre-wired specific learning mechanisms that allow them to grasp 
the regularities of their environment by focusing on domain-relevant aspects of 
data (Gelman & Williams, 1998). Natural selection is said to favor domain-
specific processing of data in core domains of knowledge, named according to 
the different kinds of ontological ‘objects’ and causality principles implied: 
“naive physics” (physical entities) (Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1994), “naive 
biology” (living beings) (Atran, 1990; Keil, 1989), “naive psychology” (mental 
states) (Wellman, 1990), and “naive arithmetic” (small numbers) (Spelke & 
Dehaene, 1999). Work on domain-specificity thus reveals how children’s 
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knowledge about objects and events expands at a terrific rate from the very 
first months of infancy, including causal expectations that are obviously 
underdetermined by experience (Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1994).  
As interesting it might be, this evolutionary conception raises two problems 
relevant to our inquiry. First, the division of cognitive labor that it puts forward 
does not take into account “naive sociology” (Hirschfeld, 1995, 1996; 
Jackendoff, 1992), that is, the way in which evolved social species process the 
affiliations, regularities and relationships structuring their social environment. 
And yet, the speculative reasoning that evolutionary psychology applies to 
other ontological domains, such as the physical or the biological domain, can 
also be applied to the social environment. The highly demanding, problem-
generating physical and social environment our ancestors lived in must have 
fostered the development of well-adapted cognitive devices, including abilities 
specifically dedicated to the selection and storage of relevant social informa-
tion. Given the importance of social coordination, group membership, and 
cooperation for evolved animals’ survival, they have most likely favored the 
emergence of domain-specific abilities (cf. Hirschfeld, this volume). Evolved 
social beings can be assumed to be internally prepared to grasp and deal with 
the expectable, elementary social regularities that emerge from the intricate 
chain of action-reaction, ensuring, as Park (1936) put it, the ecological balance 
of society. Second, such a mainstream evolutionist conception leaves mostly 
unexplained the processing of cultural information. However, if one takes 
seriously the evolutionary argument, one can indeed suppose that culture must 
have co-evolved with the cognitive abilities and facilitators necessary for its 
learning and maintenance. Our hypothesis is that analogy-making is one of 
those cognitive abilities, essential for ensuring the informational match 
between mind and culture2. Analogical mappings, which are simultaneously a 
specific kind of cognitive processing and the relatively autonomous cultural 
products of this processing, are indeed a natural way for our brains to process 
information3. Analogical thinking picks out patterns of relations, weaves 
together heterogeneous institutional and knowledge systems and finds common 
meaning in scattered, fragmentary events and representations (Hirschfeld, 
2000). Cultural analogies enable us to detect commonality in the hidden 
underlying structure of different domains of knowledge and action, to move 
unfamiliar events or bizarre cultural entities close to bodily experiences and 
phenomenological certainties, and to establish internal relationships between 
human and non-human beings, government and family, political structure and 
natural elements, and so on. (Descola, 2005). Thus grounded in the experiential 
bearings proper to the human mind, culture is not only the correlate of the 
counterintuitive, evocative, relatively free work of the imagination through 
which culture bearers distance themselves from the here-and-now imperative 
                                                 
2
 The divide we presuppose between mind and culture can be seen as artificial (or even absurd) to those 
who insist on the role of culture in shaping cognition (Vygotski, Cole, etc.). Without completely 
denying this cultural ascendancy (see our conclusion, for example), we will retain this dichotomy for 
the sake of the argument. One of the main heuristic advantages of this position is that it does not 
postulate a priori that «culture changes everything». By avoiding the isolation of the mankind from all 
other species (and of the social sciences from all other sciences), it facilitates the exploration of 
continuity between non-human and human minds. 
3
 There is still controversy about primates’ capacity for analogy-making. For D.Premack D. & A. 
Premack (2002), primates have the ability to judge the likeness of objects or rather the likeness of the 
mental representations of objects; monkeys, however, fail in conceptual matching tasks.  
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and requirements. It is also the correlate of the endless work of analogy-
making that holds culture together by creating intuitive rather than counterin-
tuitive connections between a priori separate ontological domains4. But before 
developing this hypothesis, we have to show first how social forms, and the set 
of expectancies that goes with them, might constitute the natural backbone of 
culture.  
Social forms as ontological primitives 
Compared with “brute” facts such as mountains or molecules, cultural enti-
ties are often considered disembodied and abstract, if not ghostly beings, which 
are suspended in the semiotic webs of significance human beings themselves 
have spun (Geertz, 1973). Obviously this ghost-like status does not satisfy the 
naturalist requirements for ontology. These requirements might be satisfied 
only if an ontological “missing link” is established between individual 
organisms and collective symbolic representations5. To us, this missing link 
does not consist of mental states and physical objects, that is, the entities 
accepted by naturalists until now, but of the social and nevertheless natural 
facts from which most cultural facts stem. Actually, natural entities or proper-
ties are not necessarily the physical entities or properties picked out by the laws 
of physical sciences; they also can be the universal social forms that charac-
terize primary forms of life, themselves coupled with domain-specific 
cognitive mechanisms of attention and action: basic relational “formats” 
(cooperation, dominance, kinship, competition) (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, 
Cosmides et al., 2003), patterns of actions (fighting, sharing, reconciling, 
playing) (de Waal & Filippo, 1996), situations (food gathering, political strug-
gles) (Kaufmann & Clément, 2003), and even obligations and prescriptive 
rules (Flack et al., 2004). These inductively rich social forms, easily graspable 
for competent beings, make others’ behavior highly predictable and turn the 
social world into an orderly place. The salience of group coalitions, for 
instance, enables individuals to avoid the cost of unpredictable interactions 
with strangers and to maintain relatively low-cost coordination with relevant 
nearby conspecifics (Kurzban et al., 2001; Gil-White, 2001). Given the intui-
tive relevance of those coalitional alliances, they have most likely facilitated 
the creation of cultural constructs based on group membership, such as ethnic 
groups, casts, local communities or nations. Such derivation from society to 
culture can also be found in religion if we follow Durkheim’s assumption, 
according to which God is a moral transfiguration of the influence that society 
exerts on its members (Durkheim, 1991, p. 391). In other words, culture can be 
seen as the high-level semantic elaboration and redescription of elementary 
social facts, which are, so to speak, its natural, universal substrate.  
Admitting universal social regularities or organizational “objects” to a natu-
ralistic ontology calls into question the widespread idea that psychological 
states are the only ontological bridge between natural facts and cultural phe-
                                                 
4
 The importance of analogy is highlighted in contemporary anthropology too, as demonstrated by 
Philippe Descola in his important book, Par-delà nature et culturel (2005). He notably points out that 
analogical thinking can be seen as a cognitive basis for collective representations (p. 159). 
5It is probably worth stating again that this separation between individual subjects and societal 
representations is more logical than empirical. The purpose of such a theoretical reconstruction is to 
identify the different levels of capacities that enable the emergence of human culture. Of course, once 
cultures are embodied in human communities, it is absurd to imagine any empirical person existing 
before or independently of the norms and values of her group.  
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nomena and hence that naturalism can be nothing but materialist and mentalist. 
On one hand, although those social forms are not, strictly speaking, material 
facts, they might deserve the ontological status that is usually intended for 
brute facts because they have objective, external and potentially causal proper-
ties6. On the other hand, social forms do not need to win their autonomy over 
psychological processes for the simple reason they are not, strictly speaking, 
the product of individual actions and decisions; they are based on the ecologi-
cal laws of cooperation, subordination, competition and rivalry. In other words, 
the ontological status of social forms can be compared, at least to some extent, 
with that of colors as described by Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 25). Indeed, 
colors are neither objective facts in the world, nor subjective sensations in our 
head because they are “interactional”: just as there is not some blueness in the 
sky independent of retinas, there are not social relationships out there in the 
environment independent of the competent eye of their beholders. The grasp of 
social forms indeed depends on appropriate mechanisms of perception and 
recognition, mainly gaze following, emotion and intentionality detection, and 
action monitoring (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Conein, 2005). But social forms, even 
if their qualities as we can experience and comprehend them depend crucially 
on our cognitive makeup, are as natural as colors. They are part of the sensory-
motor world of both vertical (dominance) and horizontal (affiliative) relation-
ships that hold among group members and that primates share with human 
beings (Tomasello & Rakoczy, this volume; Tomasello, 1999). In other words, 
social forms, which are, so to speak, the organizational units parsing the social 
totality, can be seen as affordances. 
Social affordances 
Affordances are the opportunities for perception and action offered by the 
environment to an organism, whether human or not, such as graspability, “sit-
on-ability” and so on. According to Gibson’s theory, affordances are relational 
properties; they are neither in the environment nor in the perceiver, but are 
derived from the ecological relationship between the perceiver and the per-
ceived so that the perceiver and perceived are logically interdependent (Gibson 
1979, Stavros Valenti & Gold 1991, Good 2007). Affordances emerge from the 
coupling between the behavioral and cognitive capacities of a given organism 
and the objective properties of its environment. This coupling is grounded in 
the long-term attunement proper to evolution: given the needs of a particular 
species, its hard wiring can be contended to have evolved in a direction that 
simplifies picking up the necessary information and parsing the environment in 
a specific way (Sanders, 1997). But this coupling is also grounded in the short-
term attunement proper to situated action: the structure of material objects but 
also of social relationships can be said to create additional environmental 
properties that constrain an additional set of actions, for instance the 
“weaponability” of a branch or the relationship-solidifying function of a gift 
(Schmidt, 2007). In both cases, the perceptual system of fine-tuned organisms 
resonates with the properties of their environment, which is essentially a field 
of practice, a “taskcape” (Ingold, 2001). 
Along the same lines as Gibson’s, our hypothesis is that the richest and 
most elaborate environmental affordances are provided by other animals and 
other people (Kaufmann & Clément, 2003). “Sexual behavior, nurturing 
                                                 
6
 On the ontological distinction between brute and institutional facts, see Searle (1995)  
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behavior, fighting behavior, cooperative behavior, economic behavior, political 
behavior - all depend on the perceiving of what another person or other persons 
afford, or sometimes on the misperceiving of it” (Gibson, 1979, p. 135). 
Between the affordances for physical interactions with the environment 
(grasping, eating, walking, etc.) and the culturally determined affordances that 
reflect preferred but not necessary interactions (i.e. hat affords wearing on 
one’s head), there might be affordances for social interactions: aggressive 
behavior affords defensive reaction, a gift affords cooperation and kin in dis-
tress affords help. By analogy to the “demand character” of objects that Koffka 
(1935) speaks of, for instance the post-box inviting the mailing of a letter, we 
thus suggest that social objects have also a “demand character”: typical social 
situations, relationships and actions trigger specific kinds of reactions and 
structure how to behave toward others and what to expect from them. As 
Véronique Servais (this volume) interestingly emphasizes, in line with Bateson 
(1963), social signals are two-sided entities; they are at the same time a report 
(on a past event) and a command or a stimulus (for a behavior). For example, 
she says, it is the “command” aspect of the baby-like features of a kitten that 
“tells” us “take it in your arms”. To us, this “command” aspect, which has the 
ability to create standard chains of social interactions and relationships, is 
made recognizable thanks to the selective attention to facial expressions, 
sounds, body postures and direction of gaze, whose meaning can be seen as 
“natural”, in Grice’s sense (1957). Just as smoke meaning fire is a matter of 
smoke being reliably connected with fire, facial expressions such as fear are 
reliably connected with the action of fleeing and gaze direction reliably indi-
cates the attention to something salient or interesting. Unlike the 
comprehension of “non-natural meanings”, which implies the use of conven-
tional symbols and the reconstitution of intentions, the recognition of the 
natural meaning of social affordances and the appropriate reaction to it are 
quasi-immediate. Just as evolved social animals have developed a visual sys-
tem that enables them to extract lawfully generated patterns in ambient light, 
they would have thus developed a quasi-perceptual system of capacities that 
would allow them to detect social affordances7. This is the specific evolved 
system of social capacities, suggested by Jackendoff (1992) and named by 
Hirschfeld (1995, 1996), that we call “naïve sociology”. Naïve sociology 
would be a phylogenetical adaptation for picking up the elementary social 
gestalts or patterns that are important to the fulfilment of survival and coopera-
tion needs. 
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 By using here the notion of « quasi-perceptual», we want to insist on the inferential work involved in 
visual cognition while keeping Gibson’s idea that an important part of the information needed to make 
sense of the world is «out there», in the external environment. Perception, defined as the « processes by 
which we organize and interpret information about the world that has been collected by our sensory 
receptors », is a complex process. It notably requires time (it is not direct), memory (recognizing 
something as a bird or a book requires the recollection of past representations which go, by definition, 
beyond the information given), and is context-sensitive (Pomerantz, 2003). It would thus be misleading 
to think of perception as deprived of the internal, complex treatment that characterizes other kinds of 
cognitive processing because the difference between perception and more inferential cognitive 
processes is more a matter of degree than a matter of kind. Therefore, while taking up the concept of 
affordance and its insightful emphasis on the contribution of external structures to perception and 
action, we do not believe in the strong perceptive/cognitive partition that can be found in ecological 
psychology. Perception is a kind of «visual cognition», even if it requires inferential work that is less 
demanding than that of action planning or discursive production. 
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Of course, the hypothesis of natural social gestalts, both shaping and being 
shaped by naïve sociology, cannot avoid one of the main issues raised by 
physical affordances in ecological psychology, namely whether the impersonal, 
objective status of affordances is culture-independent and hence whether direct 
perception is pre-social and universal (Costall, 1995)8. Does the demand or 
command character of a given thing vary according to the perceiver’s needs or 
cultural background, or does it remain, on the contrary, invariant? Different 
scholars insightfully suggest that there might be a “natural semiosis” 
(Rosenthal & Visetti, 2003) or a “primitive semiosis” (Quéré, 2001) that pre-
organizes the environment and segments the flow of socio-cultural activities 
into perception-based, observable and categorizable entities. According to 
Quéré (1999), however, the primitive semiosis permitting the preconceptual 
perception of the milieu is mediatized by the abilities, habits, rules and institu-
tions peculiar to a given community of language and practice. By contrast, the 
natural, social wholes that we hypothesize here are not dependent of cultural, 
rule-governed situations, customary practices or conventional meanings. 
Rather, they are social regularities that have elicited, over phylogeny and 
ontogeny, the development of capacities for the individuation of relevant units 
of action or relationship and the recognition of those very units as the 
occurrences of a given type. To us, the detection of physical and temporal 
regularities in the behavior stream is grounded in a “seeing-as” that is not 
culture-dependent as such, that is, not fostered by institutional constraints, 
established at the end of rational discussion or created by collective 
intentionality. This being so, if social affordances are not culturally relative, 
but depend on the needs and capabilities for action of social evolved animals, 
they differ in an important respect from the traditional physical affordances. 
These latter bring into play the instantaneity of a Gestaltist direct perception, 
which is said to be free from inferences and cognitive processing (Turvey et 
al., 1981, Reed 1996). In contrast, the “seeing-as” of universal social affor-
dances that we hypothesize involves a proto-“counting-as”, namely an 
inference-based action parsing that counts a certain event as the instantiation of 
a typical course of action. As such, the detection of social affordances is not 
inference-free; it involves a range of expectations, generalizations and predic-
tions that go beyond the information “contained” in the external environment. 
When “seeing”, for example, two individuals engaged in a hostile relationship 
at the time tn, we expect that they will not share food at the time tn+1. This 
kind of prediction, whose status is in between perceptual (e.g. they are 
anchored in perceptual cues) and theoretical processing (e.g. they go beyond 
immediate informational array), enables social beings to anticipate the out-
comes of typical situations.  
The emergence of cultural norms 
Given their intermediate status, half-inferential, half-perceptual, social 
affordances are not synonymous with mere factual, statistical frequency; on the 
contrary, the social normality of primitive forms of coordination can become 
                                                 
8
 Here again, the issue of the universality or cultural-dependency of social affordances is close to the 
debate about color processing within and across cultures. Actually, recent works emphasize the 
interaction between the perceptual saliencies of basic color categories, which would be common to all 
human beings, and the linguistic or cultural salience of color-naming. Cf. the volume of Journal of 
Cognition and Culture, vol 5, no 3, 2005 dedicated to this debate, and more particularly, the afterword 
of Don Dedrick «Color, Color Terms, Categorization, Cognition, Culture: An Afterword», pp.487-495  
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normative, even in primate societies. To some primatologists, indeed, a major 
part of behavior regulation in primates and chimpanzees can be accounted for 
in terms of social rules, either descriptive or prescriptive, and judgments of rule 
compliance (Flack et al., 2004)9. To de Waal (1991), “descriptive rules”, which 
are typical responses to a specific social situation – such as when females with 
young respond with either withdrawal or aggression to conspecifics threatening 
their offspring – must be distinguished from “prescriptive rules”. Descriptive 
rules refer to statistical regularities in social interaction patterns; by contrast, 
prescriptive rules in male sexual competition, food resources and juvenile care 
do imply a reinforced sense of how others should or should not behave as well 
as the anticipation of the consequences to one’s self of deviating from that 
regularity. The maintenance of the “order without law” that defines primate 
societies (Goodall, 1983) requires a certain level of cognitive complexity, from 
the parsing abilities to access appropriate units within social continuous 
behaviors to the expectations about the way in which oneself or others should 
be treated. 
The existence of non-institutional social rules in non-human primate socie-
ties and the cognitive complexity of their processing give an interesting insight 
into the phylogeny of human, culture-specific norms. Generally, human norms 
are believed to be the mere product of collective choice (Searle 1995) or arbi-
trary power (Foucault, 1971), that is, the result of an “instituting” moment 
whose main function would be to widen the gap between nature and culture. 
Most of the evolutionist views of norms consider the capacity for reading other 
minds, evolved in the Machiavellian race for social skills and deception, as 
their starting point: both norm compliance and prediction would involve the 
metarepresentational ability to hold in mind simultaneously what people, one-
self included, are doing and what they are supposed to do (Byrne & Whiten, 
1988). The embedding of cultural norms in natural social regularities suggests 
an alternative model that is probably complementary. In the continuist model 
of nature and culture we would like to propose here, indeed, cultural norms do 
not have necessarily intentional or mentalist origins. They can emerge from the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic readiness of well-adapted beings to learn and use 
social forms and regularities as a basis for inference and action, which ends up 
loading them with a normative weight.  
Interestingly, this process of self-reinforcement and normativisation of pre-
existing social regularity or normality is close to the model of conventions that 
Lewis (1969, 1993) speaks of, once this model is cut off from its individualis-
tic tendency. In fact, the economy of conventions might avoid one of the main 
issues raised by the naturalistic approaches that account for the genesis of rules 
in terms of collective agreement, mental representations or decision-making. 
The issue in question is the fact that, logically speaking, a collective agreement 
cannot be reached without the prior existence of shared rules making this very 
agreement or decision possible, thereby putting back ad infinitum the moment 
of the decisive creation of human-like norms. This infinite regress of rule-
                                                 
9
 According to recent findings by Flack et al. (2004), older and younger juvenile chimpanzees engaged 
in play can appropriately regulate their behavior, including their own play signaling, to avoid 
interruptions by nearby adults who might be monitoring the interaction. This fine-tuning of the signals, 
aiming to preempt the anticipated behavior of protective outsiders, e.g. the termination of the play, 
shows the juveniles’ perception of «the prescriptive social rule» regulating the expected intensity and 
noise of play. 
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based stages does not hang over the theory of conventions because conventions 
are behavioral regularities that function practically as tacit norms – not because 
of their intrinsic quality but in virtue of the coordination of actions they permit. 
Far from any explicit, contractual consent, conventions emerge from the 
mutual and convergent expectations of the normal behavior that everyone is 
presumed to adopt (Lewis, 1969; Dupuy, 1989; Quéré, 1993). The common 
bearings of coordination are the publicly manifest, objective and impersonal 
regularities of behaviors to which any competent social being tends, and is 
supposed, to conform. Seen from the angle of conventions, social conformity 
does not derive from rule or norm compliance but from the recognition of a 
new situation as being analogous to previous situations (Lewis, 1969, p. 42). 
The self-perpetuation and stabilization of expectations and actions that turned 
out to be effective and relevant in the past, including in the distant past of 
ancestral forms of life, are sufficient for action coordination to take place.  
The economy of conventions gives us useful hints about how human beings 
might derive social rules from social regularities without the mediation of 
subjective interpretations or explicit agreements. Thanks to the normativity of 
conventions, which derives ex post from conformity expectations and predic-
tions, the gap between the factual “is” of social regularities and the normative 
“ought” of cultural norms can be bridged without resorting to a primitive scene 
of agreement-making and linguistic creation. Within the conventional scenario, 
indeed, language does not constitute cultural norms from scratch by assigning 
them a deontic function (Searle, 1996); it just redescribes and then confirms a 
preexistent set of well-established practices under an explicitly normative for-
mat. Admittedly, in primate societies, this prescriptive dimension takes the 
form of a logical “must” rather than the form of a normative “ought to”. For 
instance, anyone who means to play must comply with the nonaggression pact 
that constitutes by definition the act of playing; if not, he or she is no longer 
playing but is instead instantiating another rule of action, like fighting. The 
most primitive modality of prescriptive rules consists of an if-then pattern – if 
you play, then you do not bite “for real”; it can also consist of a chain of 
“action-reaction” – if you are groomed, then you reciprocate. This kind of con-
stitutive rule enables social beings to anticipate the fact that each time A 
occurs, B will appropriately follow; and that whenever B occurs, it will have 
been preceded by A (Duncan & Farley, 1990). But even in this weak, quasi-
logical sense of rules, the naturalist continuum we want to defend here is 
maintained: the social “is” or “must” can turn into an “ ought”, that is, into 
cultural normativity, without necessarily making the symbolic leap from nature 
to culture that language and mind reading are said to trigger. From both onto-
genetic and phylogenetic perspectives, a part of cultural norms and symbols 
might remain closely related to the tangible, quasi-perceptible world of social 
forms and regularities. As Peter Goldie put it (2007), even if normative 
demands on action are not strictly speaking perceptually manifest in the way 
that colors, shapes – and, in our case, social affordances – are, they are imme-
diately recognizable: they allow socially competent individuals to see what is 
the right, appropriate thing to do in any given circumstances.  
The intuitive share of culture 
The integration of descriptive, natural social rules and normative, cultural 
norms into a continuum built upon elementary, invariant social configurations 
that have rudimentary counterparts in the animal world does justice to the 
insistence of social anthropology on the organizational aspects of socio-cultural 
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phenomena. We have hypothesized that a part of cultural norms, that is, 
culturally transmitted representations and values specifying which behaviors 
are socially commendable or punishable, appropriate or irrelevant, good or bad, 
emerged from universal social regularities. However, if the impersonal, poten-
tially universal organization of social interactions can be seen as the mark of 
the social, it does not constitute the mark of the cultural, whose study has been 
traditionally entrusted to cultural anthropologists. In fact, our continuist 
hypothesis sheds light on the emergence of cultural norms. Far from being 
created from scratch by human minds, the latter might be high-level semantic 
redescriptions and reconfigurations of pre-existent social regularities and can 
be assumed, as such, to be artificial without necessarily being arbitrary. But 
this continuist hypothesis does not yet account for the mythological, religious, 
and political constructs whose arbitrariness is said to be one essential feature. 
As pointed out by numerous scholars, the mark of the cultural is the diversity 
and relativity of the domains of constructs that furnish the human world, such 
as religion, art, ritual, ideology, and language. Indeed, “humans inhabit a world 
in which promises are explicitly made, contracts symbolically formulated, 
taboos laid down for ritual observance, often on pain of ‘supernatural’ punish-
ment” (Dunbar et al., 1999, p. 5). To pursue the same continuist line of 
reasoning as for social forms and cultural norms, we have to see whether sym-
bolically constituted constructs might have intuitive features, what would 
enhance their chances of being salient to human minds.  
To us, symbolic constructs are indeed endowed with intuitive features 
thanks to the cognitive device, namely analogy-making, which projects upon 
them intuitive expectations drawn from domain-specific knowledge and ordi-
nary experience. Yet, at first sight, analogical cross-domain mappings between 
existing structures seem to create mysterious connections rather than intuitive 
meanings, as revealed by the well-known analogical puzzles that anthropolo-
gists are used to encountering in the field: “twins are birds” (Evans-Pritchard, 
1956), “we are parrots” (Crocker, 1977), or “leopards are Christians” (Sperber, 
1975). This kind of puzzle raised such enduring perplexity in external 
observers that it triggered the counterintuitive explanation mentioned above. 
This is the violation of intuitive knowledge and ontological assumptions that 
renders the analogical strands in culture attention-arresting, evocative and 
emotionally provocative. By provoking intellectual surprise and awe, cross-
domain analogies enhance their probability of being replicated and entertained 
by human minds (Sperber, 1996; Boyer, 1994).  
The definition of culture as a set of catchy, half-understood, and juxtaposed 
representations, defined by their counter-intuitiveness, is very interesting. First, 
it succeeds in locating the essential part of culture in the mental structure of the 
minds it causally emerges from and will be realized in (Atran et al., 2005). 
Second, this counterintuitive definition of culture rightly contests the view of 
culture as a latent variable that suffuses all aspects of belief, intention, and 
collective life (for an excellent review, see Di Maggio, 1997). Third, it suc-
ceeds in releasing – at last – ordinary agents from the cultural blindness that 
used to turn ordinary people into “judgmental dopes”. But the cost of this triple 
success is heavy since such a model tends to eliminate two essential 
characteristics of culture. From an ontological point of view, it assumes that 
the interrelations weaving together different kinds of reality in the conjunctive 
fabric of cultural cross-references can be pulled apart and articulated in a set of 
individuated, labelled representations. While fending off the hypothesis of 
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cultural symbolism as a language with coded, defined meanings, the counter-
intuitive model thus retains taking the propositional format as main paradigm. 
Culture is seen as a set of causally related distant propositions or semi-
propositions, whose variously patterned distributions within and between 
human populations are assumed to be the ultimate unit of cultural analysis. 
From a cognitive point of view, the counterintuitive model assumes a one-way 
dependency that gives absolute priority to domain-specific processing of reality 
over faraway cultural interpretations and evocations. Once their epidemiologi-
cal success is ensured by their attention-arresting, memorable properties, 
cultural representations are endowed with a specific cognitive status: they are 
bracketed between circumspect “quotation marks”, which prevent their direct 
implication in the inferences and actions linked to the tangible, indubitable 
reality of the natural world (Sperber, 1975). In postulating an impervious 
cognitive barrier between basic-level, concrete primary domains of experience 
and abstract, secondary cultural constructions, this model posits both 
individual and collective clear-headedness as for the situated and “for-
evocation-only” status of culture (Sperber, 1996).  
The problem is that this conception, pushed to an extreme degree, suggests 
that culture, ideology, and religion are mere epiphenomena: individuals owe to 
the nature of their brains the innate ability to keep their distance from the cul-
tural world around them. By restricting counterintuitive analogies to a culture-
bound system of knowledge kept apart from the intuitive, reality-based system 
of knowledge that organizes experience, this view leaves aside the issue of the 
ontological commitments that culture can foster, mainly via the naturalization 
of ideological meanings10. Moreover, the counterintuitive view does not take 
into consideration the fact that the cultural world has analogical mappings at its 
disposal to enter the supposedly impenetrable cognitive basis for inference and 
action. Analogical predications draw relational commonalities that are more 
intuitive than counterintuitive. As will be seen, this intuitiveness is not only 
due to the “anchoring” of analogies in sensorimotor experiences and phenome-
nological certainties that constitute, if we follow Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 
1999), the “hidden hand” of cultural understanding. It is also due to the politi-
cal art that consists of turning arbitrary cultural elaborations into taken-for-
granted, deferential representations. This is the intuitive part of culture, either 
resulting from a “bottom-up”, experience-based process of “reappropriation” or 
a “top-down”, ideological process of embodiment, that the next and final part 
will consider. 
II. CULTURE AND THE ANALOGICAL MIND 
Two main modes of information processing 
For a long time, anthropologists had a tendency to distinguish between two 
main kinds of thought, whether rational and symbolic, logical and participa-
tive, or engineer- and handyman-like. Although this condescending approach, 
which led to a phylogenetical and ontogenetical hierarchy between primitive 
                                                 
10
 Naturalization has two senses that make this term ambiguous and interesting. In the social sciences, 
naturalization refers to the process of making arbitrary, culture-made institutions look natural, timeless 
and definitive. In cognitive science, it refers to the assumption that human beings are the evolved 
products of natural selection and are, as such, shaped by the various processes – physical, biological, 
psychological – that science describes. We will return to the polysemy of the term «naturalization» in 
our conclusion. 
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and elaborated modes of thinking, has been abandoned, contemporary 
cognitive science is far from invalidating the existence of different types of 
cognitive mechanisms. Nowadays, cognitive and developmental psychologies 
tend to discriminate between two main modes of reasoning and understanding, 
namely the causal and the analogical11. These two “cognitive subspecies” are 
high-level modes of information processing, both organizing in their own way 
the perceptual and low-level conceptual knowledge provided by the modular, 
foundational treatment of inputs12. Both modes of reasoning are thus rooted in 
the same universal abilities that allow human beings, if not primates, to extract 
a significant “surplus” of information from the episodic and fragmentary data 
provided by their environment. Although present too early in the development 
to involve explicit meta-representational ability, which is cognitively too 
“heavy” for young children, analogical and causal thinking probably involve a 
tacit, fundamental meta-representational capacity, either for detecting relations 
between objects (causality) or relations between the relations between objects 
(analogy). For Goswami (2001), both modes of thought show the primacy of 
“relational processing”, either based upon attributes of objects (solid, round) 
or upon relations (push, collide).  
However, causal and analogical relational ways to “comprehend” informa-
tion that would be otherwise scattered and muddled are different in many 
respects. Causal thinking draws an external connection between a priori sepa-
rated entities, for instance a billiard ball bumping into another one. The 
identification of the causal link connecting the antecedent event with the con-
sequent event, in this case the impact of the first ball and the movement of the 
second ball allows us to explain and predict their respective behavior. The 
detection of causal links thus enables us to reach understanding via an expla-
nation, whether mechanist, functional, intentional or essentialist, which is 
fundamentally sequential. The explanation consists of integrating into a tempo-
ral order of succession the events brought about by the intervention of 
individuated, external entities – whether this intervention is contingent (the 
encounter of billiard balls) or law-like (the sun causes the photosynthesis of 
plants).  
Unlike causal thinking, analogical thinking does not apply to entities but to 
relational patterns that make an obscure phenomenon intelligible by relating it 
to a familiar, comprehensible one (Gentner et al., 2001c). Analogical mapping 
plays a crucial role in understanding (also in scientific disciplines) because it 
enables to transfer a relational property from a well known “source domain” to 
a largely unknown “target domain”. For example, the flow of people in a 
crowded subway can be compared to the flow of electrons in an electrical cir-
cuit, what leads to the following relational matching: “the resistor decreases the 
flow of electricity as a narrow gate decreases the flow of people” (Gentner et 
al., 2001a). The key similarities lie in the relations that hold within domains 
rather than in intrinsic features of individual objects; electrons are not like 
people, even though the flow of electrons is analogically similar to the flow of 
                                                 
11The issue of which labels would be more appropriate to those two kinds of reasoning remains a 
controversial topic. If we follow Tanguay (1984) for instance, neuro-psychologists distinguish two 
forms of cognitive processing, the “holistic” and the “sequential” modes of thought.  
12
 This being so, it seems that analogy-making and causal detection do not occur at exactly the same 
level of the cognitive architecture. In fact, analogical mappings are based on relations between relations 
whereas causal relations are drawn between objects. 
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people. Similarly, the analogy “Mind is a Computer” requires a structural 
alignment from the domains it relates, that is, the mental world and the com-
putational operations, such as information processing, encoding, feedback and 
memory stores, which characterize artificial intelligence. Far from being 
sequential, analogical thinking can be seen as “holistic” or structural: it picks 
out patterns, identifies recurrences of these patterns despite variation in the 
elements that compose them and forms concepts or symbols that abstract and 
reify the patterns in question. Analogical thinking, therefore enables us to 
recognize the similarity of relations between forms (two triangles are similar to 
two circles), situations (the groom veils his bride’s face like the lioness covers 
her brood) or roles (the relation of “marriage” between “husband” and “wife” 
are distinct from the particular fillers of the role, e.g. John and Mary) (Gentner, 
2001b)13. Evidence for the precocious development of such relational 
processing, fully acquired at the age of 4, is the fact that infants are able to 
draw an analogy between visual inputs (an arrow pointing downward or up-
ward) and acoustic inputs (ascending tone of music) (Wagner and al., 1981), to 
connect their own felt but unseen movements with the seen but unfelt move-
ments of others (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2001), and to empathize with other’s 
emotional states (Barnes & Thagard, 1997)14.  
For certain scholars, analogical reasoning is so central that it is not just one 
way of thinking among others but the very core of cognition. According to 
Hofstadter (2001), for instance, every concept is a packaged bundle of analo-
gies because it involves a mental matching, necessarily approximate, between 
single words and perceived situations, prior categories and new things, or old 
memories and novel occurrences. Although this overextension of analogical 
processing tends to wrongly suppress some important differences between 
sequential and holistic thinking, it does emphasize an important point: far from 
being confined to scientific laboratories and problem-solving tasks psycholo-
gists have insisted on, analogy-making plays a key role in everyday life. It also 
plays a key role in the incredible symbolic profusion that characterizes culture.  
Cultural analogies 
Drawing relational matching across diverse conceptual domains and inte-
grating them into new generative blends is a very powerful natural ability. It 
helps individuals to go beyond what they directly encounter and to look for 
common patterns in different domains of knowledge and experience. This 
piece–together patterning can be seen as the essence of culture in the symboli-
cally constituted sense of cultural anthropology. It is an essential element of the 
“tool kit” or the “prosthetic devices”, as Bruner (1990, p. 21) put it, by which 
human beings can exceed or even redefine the natural limits of human func-
tioning in order to make sense of the world they live in. By contrast with the 
universality of social affordances, the conceptual commonalities created by 
analogical patterning are culture-specific. As such, they are only graspable by 
                                                 
13
 As Gentner and al. (2001b, p. 241) put it, those analogies derive their force not from a local 
resemblance between physical objects and memory traces but rather from mapping the system of 
relationships in which these objects are embedded.  
14
 As with the motor analogies that Piaget pointed out, infants compute the relations between organs, 
such as tongue-to-lips, and use these to represent both their own behavior and that of the adult. The 
perceived organ thus provides the target that the infant attempts to match, which requires from her the 
recognition of the structural equivalence between another agent’s behavior and her own (Meltzoff, 
1990). 
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competent natives or, perhaps, by an ethnographer “experience-near” enough 
to reconstruct not what natives effortlessly perceive, which is impossible, but 
what they perceive “with” – or “by means of”, or “through” (Geertz, l975). For 
an outsider, the reconstruction of this culture-specific perception is all the more 
difficult because cultural analogies, unlike scientific analogies, rarely consist of 
a “one-way” explicit alignment from the representational elements of a known 
source domain to that of an unknown target domain. Similar in this respect to 
literary metaphors, cultural analogies are characterized by a cascade of cross-
weaving connections that make it very difficult to recognize any one-to-one 
correspondences.  
This is precisely the difficulty in accounting for the conceptual path that 
underpins cultural analogies which struck the anthropologist Lawrence 
Hirschfeld in his fieldwork in Sumatra (Hirschfeld, 2000). Very impressed 
with Toba Batak aesthetic productions, he asked the locals about the meaning 
of carved stylized lions on each house and was offered an explanation in terms 
of indirect kinship exchange. Despite seeing an obvious connection between 
these architectural pieces of art and “the social mechanics of matrilateral cross-
cousin marriage”, the Toba were not able to explain this connection to the 
perplexed anthropologist (Hirschfeld, 2000). Hirschfeld hypothesizes that this 
connection did remain mysterious to the Toba, in the sense of not being fully 
interpretable, because kinship was “what Toba monumental architecture was 
about but not what it meant”. In other words, analogical mapping between 
kinship and aesthetic production was stipulated rather than inferred from 
mapped relations, which leads Hirschfeld to favor a counterintuitive thesis. 
These mysterious analogies would be the sort of terminally uninterpretable 
representations that Sperber (1996) sees as being catchy candidates for stable 
and widely distributed cultural representations.  
And yet the analogical mapping between kinship and aesthetic production, 
although mysterious and unexplained to the anthropologist, is not necessarily 
meaningless or beyond the cognitive grasp of natives. Analogical predications 
might well be pregnant with felt but unconceptualized meanings that come 
closer to a “seeing as” embedded in a worldview than to a “seeing that” easily 
translatable into some isolated assertion of similarity, either propositional or 
semi-propositional. As Davidson (1978) put it, what analogies make us notice 
is not finite in scope and propositional in nature; they do not have an encoded 
cognitive content, a conveyed message that interpreters must identify15. Analo-
gies provide competent perceivers with a kind of lens or lattice enabling them 
to perceive relevant resemblances without actually saying or hiding them. 
Actually, Davidson says, when analogies make us notice a figure like a duck 
instead of a rabbit, there are no propositions expressing how it led us to see 
that. For analogies belong exclusively to the domain of use: they are brought 
off by our imaginative, context-dependent employment of words and concepts, 
which allows one thing to remind us of another16.  
                                                 
15We have chosen to apply to analogy what Davidson says about metaphor to the extent that the basic 
processes of analogies are also at work in metaphor, namely structural alignment, inference projection, 
progressive abstraction, and re-presentation (Gentner et al., 2001a). 
16
 Counter to the dual stage hypothesis, which asserts that people first attempt to process literally a 
meaning and, when they fail, try to process it non-literally (Searle, 1976, Sperber, 1975), this pragmatic 
view sees the analogical meanings people are familiar with as a kind of polysemy that is spontaneously 
enacted when the context is favorable. 
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From this perspective, it is no wonder that semantic inquiry and the pro-
positional account are not suitable for analogies, particularly if they belong to 
extended cultural systems such as the Toba Batak one. The “lion-kinship” 
mapping might indeed be a frozen, dead or latent analogy of which users are no 
longer aware – a mapping that became conventionalized to the point that its 
metaphoricity was forgotten (like the analogical mapping according to which a 
minister was a small man as opposed to a magister, a big man). (Johnson, 
1981; Miller, 1979). Once conventionalized, latent analogies become part of 
the mostly unconscious cultural frame that prompts intuitive insights and 
directs attention to some salient properties over others. Tracking down the 
likeness that the mapped elements and hence the original domains bear to one 
another might therefore be hopeless. For cultural analogies are less the product 
of a one-way structural alignment between source and target domains than the 
elaboration of a new “meta-domain”, an imaginative blend which develops an 
emergent organization of its own (T. Turner, 1991; Fauconnier, 1997, 
Fauconnier & M. Turner, 1998). In other words, analogical mapping creates a 
“new mental assembly”, a conceptual blend, which triggers a specific set of 
inferences, solutions and actions (M. Turner, 2001). A creative blend like 
“Man is Wolf to Man”, for instance, draws on the ferocity of the wolf to 
highlight a largely unknown target domain – human nature – and ends up 
reified in an institution such as wolf-like competition in the free market. Once 
integrated into a new blend, the contributing domains of the blend (e.g. “man” 
and “wolf”) do not remain intact; on the contrary, they are restructured by 
continual revision and backtracking (i.e. the man becomes more “wolfy” and 
the wolf more human) (Black, 1955).  
The participative stance 
Unlike most scientific analogies, for instance “flow of electrons - flow of 
people”, cultural analogies generate a blending, that is, an invisible conceptual 
meta-domain that rules the cross-domain alignment between A and B (e.g. 
architecture/kinship, wolf/man, etc.) and therefore fosters culture bearers to 
think of A as B17. If neither natives nor anthropologists are able to reconstitute 
the original domains of a given cultural blend, for instance the well-known 
“Twins are Birds” of the Nuer, it is because the blend functions as a triadic rule 
and transforms both terms of the analogical mapping, in this case twins and 
birds, into the instantiations of a third, higher order (Evans-Pritschard, 1956; 
Fernandez, 1977). Statements such as “twins are birds” are made in relation to 
a third term: “They are statements, as far as the Nuer are concerned, not that A 
is B but that A and B have something in common in relation to C” (Evans-
Pritchard, 1956, p.142). The latent generic characteristic that associates twins 
and birds is spirit: twins, like birds, occupy an intermediary position between 
supreme spirit and human beings. To recognize this position as the common, 
and supposedly preexistent, concept justifying the enrolment of twins and birds 
in the same symbolic blend, individuals must reach a higher level of abstrac-
                                                 
17Although analogical thinking is grounded on a unique cognitive operation, the production of cultural 
analogies is less constrained and rigorous than scientific analogies. In theory indeed, analogical 
alignment follows three main steps: the «mapping step», which consists of finding one-to-one 
correspondences, based on the sameness of relations, between the source and the target domain, the 
«inference step», whose main task is drawing goal-relevant inferences, and the «learning step», which 
consists of abstracting more general commonalities between the domains at stake (Holyoak & Thagard, 
1997). Clearly, cultural alignments do not follow these three steps systematically. 
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tion that frees them from a preoccupation with the contributing parts of the 
blend in question and enables them to get to the whole (T. Turner, 1991). The 
distinction between source domain and target domain does lose relevance in 
the organized blending and structural homologies that constitute culture as a 
symbolic totality.  
Far from being autonomous, isolated building blocks of culture, therefore, 
analogical mappings have a metonymic dimension: they hold for the cultural 
totality in which members can participate only by a stretch of the imagination. 
To enter the totality constituted by cultural commonalities, individuals have, 
indeed, to adopt a participative stance that allows them to go beyond their own 
narrow sphere of experience and thereby to reach the sphere of the collective 
imagination18. In other words, cultural bearers have to give up both on the fic-
tional stance devoted to invisible, anomalous entities (e.g. Santa Claus, the 
Tooth Fairy) and on the empirical stance devoted to creatures that exist and can 
be seen, either directly or by means of a veridical representation such as a 
photograph or film (e.g., wolves, tigers) (Harris et al., this volume). They have 
to adopt instead a participative stance that requires a deferential attitude 
towards the strange entities and analogical blends furnishing their world19. By 
enabling the grasp of collective constructs, cultural analogies included, this 
deferential attitude plays an important role in the symbolic and social integra-
tion of community members. Symbolic integration because they foster the 
diffuse feeling that all beings and orders separated in everyday life have 
become the interdependent parts of a unique totality, suffused with meaning20. 
When enacted in specific cultural contexts, the relation of representation that 
ordinarily underlies analogical predications turns into a relation of ontological 
equivalence: instead of representing birds, twins are birds for they belong with 
                                                 
18
 Of course, the term «participative» alludes to Lévy-Bruhl’s work on the mystical experience, 
enhanced by collective ceremonies, which allows community members to access the invisible part of 
the whole social structure. After attributing the indifference to the law of contradiction only to the 
«primitive mind», Lévy-Bruhl (1938) extended it to any kind of mystical experience. Having entered a 
nonsensible, invisible world, community members can hold two contradictory beliefs, one ordinary, the 
other social, because they replace momentarily the «principle of non-contradiction» with the «law of 
participation» permitting, for instance, the dead to be a corpse and a spirit at the same time.  
19The issue of deference can not be dealt with in this paper but it has an important role to play in the 
transformation of a priori anomalous blendings into endorsed, obvious matchings. In fact, ordinary 
agents defer to a competent authority, whether it be the collectivity as a whole or the «experts» who 
represent it, the task of attributing to cultural, a priori empty concepts the referents to which they are 
not entitled in theory (e.g. the Ancestors’ spirits, God, the Virgin, etc.). This validation on credit allows 
us to distinguish deferential concepts (the Virgin, public opinion) from referential concepts that 
represent tangible objects (elm, water), as well as from fictional concepts whose use is valid only within 
a restricted context, isolated from the real world (Frankenstein, Sherlock Holmes). On this matter, see 
Kaufmann (2006) 
20
 Interestingly, Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1999) have shown that mystical feelings are frequent in 
patients with seizures originating in the temporal lobes. As his patient John put it, «finally I see what 
it’s really about, Doctor. I really understand God. I understand my place in the universe, in the cosmic 
scheme». Perhaps the important difference between those individual delusions and the collective 
hallucinations that cultural analogies lead to lies in the «sharedness» of the latter. Otherwise, cultural 
analogies seem to respond to the same human need, namely the determination of a salient landscape, 
which highlights what is pragmatically important and emotionally relevant. In strengthening some 
pathways, cultural analogies progressively deepen the emotional significance of some categories of 
inputs, imbuing everything, whether a grain of sand, a piece of driftwood, or a birdsong, with deep 
cosmic significance. See also Bazin (1991). 
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them in the same order of being. Cultural analogies also facilitate social inte-
gration because they integrate scattered individuals into the meaningful 
cultural totality that all members of the community are part of. Just as political 
rituals, religious ceremonies, cultural constructs and more specifically cultural 
analogies work to maintain the “collective effervescence” that Durkheim 
(1991) speaks of. As Fernandez (1974) put it, one crucial mission of cultural 
analogies is indeed to transform the pronoun “I” into a “We” that integrates 
individuals into a “collective mind”, whether it be called Spirits, God, Society, 
or Nation. Interestingly, this twofold function of integration has been recently 
emphasized by anthropologists interested in the evolutionary origins of culture 
(Dunbar et al., 1999). Symbolic systems (e.g., rituals, religion, ideologies, or 
myths) are seen as an adaptative, evolutionary stable strategy to secure inte-
gration and cooperation in human social groups and to avoid free riders that 
would lead society to disintegration. To Dunbar, Knight and Power (1999), 
following here Durkheim’s hypothesis, the cognitive acknowledgment of 
“contractual intangibles”, like spirits, divinities or totems, ensures group-level 
allegiance and might be, as such, a product of human coalitionary strategies.  
It remains to be seen whether the natives’ cognitive acknowledgment of the 
bizarre beings and puzzling analogies that seem to be endorsed in the public 
discourses and cultural practices of their community is synonymous with a 
genuine ontological commitment. Given their departure from the actual state of 
affairs, those publicly endorsed beings should involve one way or another the 
“willing suspension of disbelief” proper to the “poetic transactions” that Levin 
(1979: 134) speaks of. But if anomalous beings are said to provoke only a kind 
of minor, distant, and aesthetic commitment, how are we to explain that those 
very beings, once culturally loaded, become the essential workings of symbolic 
and social integration? In fact, it is not difficult to explain since collective con-
structs do not necessarily require committed, blind beliefs from individuals to 
operate as cultural glue. The specific kind of belief that certain philosophers 
like Tuomela (1995) call “positional belief” or “we-mode belief” might be 
sufficient for their maintenance: “positional belief” is indeed a collective belief 
that an individual endorses as a community member but does not necessarily 
endorse as a private person. For instance, natives might “We-believe” in the 
existence of the ancestors’ spirits without privately endorsing the correspon-
dent “I-mode belief”. This perspective interestingly allows us to break with a 
passive conception of culture bearers as blindly swallowing the associations at 
work in their symbolic environment while emphasizing the creative shift from 
the ordinary order of things that the grasp of collective commonalities 
involves. For the reality shift, which allows initiates to enter a culture-specific, 
mind-dependent order of being in which the boundaries dividing the prosaic 
world seem to blur, must not be overestimated. It must be all the less overesti-
mated as the “mental leaps”, as Holyoak & Thagard (1995) put it, which enable 
individuals to go beyond the privacy of the experiential process and the infor-
mation given to see one thing as if it were another, draw heavily on preexistent 
concepts and well-known properties. If “the work of the imagination” (Harris, 
2000) can turn impossible worlds into culturally possible worlds relatively 
easily, it is because those very possible worlds are deeply rooted in familiar 
source domains and sensorimotor experiences. Despite infringing the natural 
boundaries between the physical, biological, psychological, and social domains 
they are grounded in, cross-domain analogies do maintain a constitutive link to 
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those natural domains – constitutive enough, at least, to make them partly 
intuitive.  
Constituting the cultural order as “natural”: Why Bororo men are 
Parrots 
Emphasizing the intuitive share of analogical mappings returns us to the is-
sue of cognitive and ontological continuity that we are interested in. Despite 
cutting the world at its cultural joints, generative analogies eclipse neither the 
ontological domains that carve nature at its joints nor the social affordances 
that carve the social world. They reinforce and perpetuate the preexistent natu-
ral and social saliencies that easily lend themselves to this cultural work of 
redescription. In fact, nature is such an essential source domain that it can be 
endowed with a “universal donor status” (Gentner et al., 2001b, p. 242). Ana-
logical mappings drawing from nature have a “relational generativity” (di 
Sessa, 1983) that makes them cognitively as well as ideologically efficient: by 
grounding the cultural order in nature, they cement the architecture supporting 
the edifice of collective beliefs and public “truths”. As Mary Douglas (1986) 
put it, analogical connections between “the formal structure of natural species” 
and the formal structure of institutions establish the foundational “cognitive 
conventions” necessary to overcome the sense of contingency and arbitrariness 
that risks undermining those very institutions at any moment.  
In this respect, analogical blending is a very effective ideological device: 
linking the cultural order to a natural order impervious to human agency and 
familiar to everybody masks its arbitrary origins. For instance, the analogical 
mapping “woman is to man what the left hand is to the right hand” conceals 
political hierarchy behind a supposedly natural complementarity which cuts 
across different cultural contexts and can serve to justify long-term asymme-
tries (Douglas, 1986). Analogical cross-references to the movement of planets 
in the sky and the natural behavior of plants, animals and people contribute to 
institutionalizing cultural conventions by founding them in nature and then in 
reason. Once cultural constructs lose their “man-made” appearance and are 
virtually indistinguishable from the “natural”, the idea that human beings 
created them is an unlikely cognition (Gabennesch, 1990). By grounding 
institutions in the abstract structure of nature and attributing a natural quality to 
forces that are essentially human in origin and maintenance, most cultural 
blends seal conventions and reinforce the status quo. In other words, they are 
ideological achievements.  
This being so, analogical mappings between the natural universe and the 
cultural world can be an efficient means of cognitive control and cultural con-
formity only if they are related one way or another to social organization. We 
have seen that elaborate and sophisticated organizational forms, such as nations 
and ethnic groups, can derive from the naturalness of universal social forms, 
like coalitional alliances. But analogical mappings must come to terms not only 
with the universal invariants of society but also with the local functioning of 
the social structure. This claim is particularly well illustrated in Crocker’s 
impressive study of the well-known Bororo statement “We are Parrots” 
(Crocker, 1977). To Crocker, the analogical connection between “Men” and 
“Parrots” is grounded in the area of male-female social relationships for only 
Bororo males are said to be parrots. To explain this specific connection, 
Crocker shows that parrots are the only kind of domestic pet found among the 
Bororo, a pet whose ownership is almost entirely limited to women who have 
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lost children. Although parrots are said to welcome souls after death, with 
which they have in common their diet of fish and pale appearance, they are not 
domestic shrines. As domestic pets, they occupy a position neither wholly 
animal nor completely human nor sacred creature, while sharing some 
esteemed and some gross qualities of each. In Crocker’s view, the postulate 
“We are Parrots” is metaphorical of the masculine condition; each man is 
actually an intruder into the female-dominated household in which he resides, 
ingests food, enjoys sexuality, procreates and exists on a daily basis. He shares 
with all other Bororo men the status of ambiguous creatures whose obligations 
of uterine domicile are in some ways opposed to their residential duties. 
Bororo rituals normatively emphasize patrifiliation and uterine brotherhood 
and, since they are mostly forbidden to women, selectively put men under the 
aegis of the spirits. But this convulsive effort to escape the almost total 
dominion of women seems hopeless. Even death itself does not transcend the 
limits of matrilineal domination; once projected upon the domain of spirit, the 
man’s soul is assigned to the responsibility of a woman. “In a very real sense, a 
Bororo can never leave home. Like a parrot, he is perpetually a child of collec-
tive mothers” (Crocker, 1977, p. 191). Analogical mapping between men and 
parrots thus reveals that both entities are raw material, the temporary vehicle 
for spirits and social transactions. Like parrots, whose food and sexuality are 
sought by the spirits, men are used by women for utilitarian ends. Actually, 
women are exchanging men rather than the reverse: just as they domesticate 
parrots, they bind masculine loyalties and check their freedom of action.  
If, in Crocker’s case, the “man/parrot” blend seems to stage and symbolize 
women’s social domination rather than overcome or criticize it, the role of 
analogical predications can clearly be less doxic and self-perpetuating, that is, 
more creative. They not only establish and reinforce the what-is of the thing of 
which they speak but can also create, through unheard-of “sort crossing”, new 
frames of intelligibility (Miller, 1979). For instance, switching from a view of 
war as deterrence to a view of war as legalized murder makes drastic modifi-
cations to the conceptual framework of public debate: it replaces language and 
thought framing in terms of game with a critical framing of war as a slaughter 
of human beings – a new “seen as” that provides an alternative way of com-
prehending things and constrains some specific political solutions. Analogical 
mappings help to reorganize aspects of reality by enabling us to see some of its 
aspects as something else – a creative projection that is constitutive of culture 
and politics (Black, 1979). For culture and politics are not observable directly 
by the senses; they are constituted by shared analogies and meanings which 
serve as a “nondefinitional mode of reference fixing” (Boyd, 1979, p. 358). 
They extend the referential field beyond visible, perceptible things in such a 
way that cultural and political kinds, that is, unobservable kinds whose real 
essences consist of complex relational properties, become more familiar, if not 
intuitive. As Black (1979) put it, metaphors and analogies are ontologically 
creative: they create things that did not exist before they were perceived and 
that, once recognized, are truly present. For Black, cultural and political analo-
gies give insights into “how things are”, unlike literary metaphors that manifest 
an odd predilection for asserting a thing to be what it is not; they enable us to 
see aspects of reality that analogical production helps to constitute. In other 
words, analogical processing does not compare two things in the world and 
then locate “out there” their preexistent hidden matches; it is a creative 
“seeing-as” procedure that forges “family resemblance” between unfamiliar 
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events or entities and usual patterns of meaningful experience (Wittgenstein, 
1981, §67). 
Political inventiveness and ideological naturalization: the French 
Revolution 
The contribution of analogies and metaphors to conceptual innovation and 
cultural construction is particularly manifest in the case of the French 
Revolution, where folk inventiveness led to both the symbolic and the real 
overthrow of the king’s authority (Kaufmann, 2003). At that time, analogical 
predications had many political implications, whether they took part in the 
gross expression of humble people or in the alternative model of society elabo-
rated by erudite thinkers. Both erudite and folk theory of politics were indeed 
very strongly marked by bodily and familial metaphors that were at first 
actively involved in the tenets serving the monarchical legitimization and then 
little by little turned upside down by satires and farces trivializing the sacro-
sanct body of the king.  
Actually, the seminal power of the “two bodies of the king”, that is, the 
physical body and the sacred, political body he incarnated, was the symbol of 
national prosperity (Kantorowicz, 1957). The majesty of the Political Body, 
whose health and offspring were synonymous with wealth for the realm, 
depended closely on the health of the natural body in charge of its succession. 
The king’s body was thus an affair of state that demanded the control of the 
highest authorities and the supervision of the most renowned physicians (de 
Baecque, 1993). One understands, therefore, how the political chaos arose, at 
the middle of the eighteen century, through the broad diffusion of the king’s 
counter-portrait in seditious lampoons and bawdy engravings. The meticulous 
narratives of moral depravity and physical weakness of the king reduced 
gradually his double body into one single banal body that was no longer any-
thing more than a toy in the hands of his ”whores” (Louis XV), or a grotesque 
body suspected of impotence (Louis XVI) (Darnton, 1982, 1995). As Bakhtin 
(1968) put it, the “crude physiologism” and the “corporal point of view” pecu-
liar to popular culture challenged the dominant gaps between the high and the 
low, the close and the far, the private and the public, and the temporal and the 
spiritual (Bakhtin, 1968). “Grotesque realism”, by replacing all spiritual, ideal 
and abstract things with embodied experience, proclaimed a new cosmological 
principle: the people’s body is the unique and generic guardian of the ultimate 
power, which is nothing but the reproductive and regenerative power of Nature 
(Bakhtin, 1968, pp. 28/469). 
The fatal implications for the monarchy of the bodily obsessions of public 
rumors were still intensified by the decline of the paternal figure of the king. 
The change in familial experiences and unconscious collective images of the 
familial order – such as father-son, husband-wife and parent-child relations –
 enabled the revolutionary political constructions to break with the patriarchal 
ideology of absolutism and to promise the patriotic rule of fraternal solidarity 
within the “Mother-nation” (Hunt 1992). In the leading “familial romances” of 
the 18th century, the Father-patriarch figure declined in favor of the autonomi-
zation of the action field of children whose orphan or foundling status no 
longer prevented their carving out a place in the social world. Thus, during the 
Revolution, bodily and familial analogical mappings had serious consequences. 
They opened a new field of practices, such as the institutionalization of an 
acephalous Republic and the decisive “acting out” going with it: the 
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disappearance of the king’s political and natural bodies in favor of the new 
spirit of the nation, that is, public opinion. Thanks to their phenomenological 
roots but also to their previous political use in the monarchical regime, bodily 
and familial analogies allowed a gestalt switch from the waning figure of the 
King to the rising figure of the Nation.  
This example shows how analogies drawing on intuitive knowledge, such 
as corporal boundaries and physiological needs, are instantly comprehensible 
and thereby trigger a “taking-for-granted” stance: every single individual is 
able to project what he or she knows “from the inside” onto the complex and 
apparently exogenous functioning of collective life. As the highest common 
denominator of a given community, the mundane obviousness of the ordinary 
life facilitates the folk appropriation and comprehension of abstract constructs 
(Kaufmann, 2003). The example of the French revolution also shows that, if 
the phenomenological source domain of cognition is universal enough to set up 
a basic ontological complicity between ordinary agents, it is also heavy enough 
to facilitate the naturalization of a new political world-view in individual 
minds. By stirring up the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expecta-
tion” of ordinary agents to their advantage, a previously unrealistic and 
impossible world can gradually become a possible, or even familiar, world 
(Koselleck 1985). In September 1793, indeed, once the people was seen as a 
collective individual whose will had to be naturally unanimous, particular 
wishes looked like the immoral, destructive and corrupted parts of the social 
body. By making disagreement and discord synonymous with the collapse of 
the social body, the revolutionaries took “the physiological argument” literally 
enough to behave as physicians who had the duty to diagnose and to cure 
social pathologies (de Baecque, 1993). By naturalizing politics and turning it 
into therapeutics, the literalization of bodily analogies led to “the generalized 
anthropophagy” of the Terror. It transformed the interpretative inferences con-
tained in intuitive analogies into an outright ideology, in the double sense of 
ideal intensification of experience and naturalization of political abstraction.  
CONCLUSION: CULTURAL OPTICS 
On the ontological side, the social naturalism we defend here hypothesizes 
the existence of social forms that would be the universal ground for cultural 
elaboration and normative constructs. The “natural meaning” of those elemen-
tary social forms is the mediation, the intermediate layer that bridges the gap 
between natural constraints and artificial cultural systems. On the cognitive 
side, social naturalism emphasizes: (1) the importance of a quasi-perceptual 
system of inferences, namely naive sociology, dedicated to the processing of 
group-level, socially relevant traits; and (2) the prevalence of analogy-making 
as a device for creating and identifying the overall cultural pattern that gives 
common resonance to heterogeneous domains of knowledge and integrates 
them into new conceptual blends. Analogy-making can thus be seen as the 
basic cognitive operation that forges and holds together the relational networks 
constituting the essence of human culture.  
Our emphasis on the intuitive share of culture, established and enacted 
thanks to the analogical stretch of phenomenological experience, ordinary con-
ceptualization and social categorization, differs in several respects from the 
counterintuitive account of culture as a series of evocative, semi-propositional 
riddles. First, unlike counterintuitive representations, intuitive analogies are not 
insulated propositions; most of them are unconscious frames of thought and 
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latent patterns for action that culture bearers convey through gestures rather 
than through isolated, expressible propositions. Cultural propositions are only 
the tip of a system of submerged cross-references that functions, so to speak, as 
a “pinball machine”: once involved in a relational system that makes sense 
immediately, community members can hardly isolate a single cultural claim 
(unless this claim is an official tenet, a public utterance that is not necessarily, 
as such, believed in or put into practice). In other words, making cultural 
assumptions explicit requires members to be able to distance themselves from 
the culture they belong to. Now this distance is relatively rare. Most of the 
time, primary, generative mappings are so embedded in the cultural system that 
only cognitive archaeology, anthropology and cultural history are capable of 
retrieving and individuating them. This embedding is not very surprising since 
forgetting the origins of cultural meanings is a mark of tradition, which is 
nothing but the rehearsal of habits and practices that are no longer justified – if 
they were ever justified at all. Given the autonomization and institutionaliza-
tion of analogical blending and the progression towards oblivion of their 
original justification, if any, tracking down the third variable that establishes in 
which respect their source and target domains can be seen as similar is often 
impossible, just as in Hirschfeld (2000)’s example of carved lions and kinship 
exchange.  
Second, unlike the counterintuitive model of culture, our intuitive model 
insists on the analogical workings of the mind in virtue of which cultural 
elaborations become “quasi-perceptible”. Drawing from the cognizance of our 
senses, social commonsense included, analogical mapping is the “continuist 
glue” that transfers intuition, if not perception, from usual patterns of meaning-
ful experience to unfamiliar events or obscure entities. Admittedly, the 
intuitive creation and reappropriation of cultural constructs retain an artificial 
dimension, due to the work of the imagination necessary for entertaining repre-
sentations that are somewhat unfaithful to the way the world really is. But we 
have seen that artificiality is not synonymous with arbitrariness in the sense of 
mere product of unfounded will: analogical blends are grounded in social 
affordances that cannot be said to be artificial constructs per se since their use 
is not restricted to mankind. Social regularities can indeed be found in a more 
rudimentary form in non-human societies whose orderliness, impressive as it 
may be, is generally characterized as not cultural – at least if we characterize, 
with Searle (1995), culture as the institution of new “count-as” (i.e. “this red 
line on the ground” counts as “a border”). Thanks to the quasi-naturalness of 
the social affordances they derive from, cultural affordances such as analogical 
relationships have a solid ontological scaffolding.  
As seen above, the naturalization process that leads to the quasi-perceptive 
status of analogical mapping is twofold. From an analytical viewpoint, it refers 
either to the ideological, “top-down” naturalization of cultural analogies that 
descend into the background of tacit knowledge of community members; or to 
the phenomenological, “bottom-up” extension of intuitive expectations that 
ascend from hard-wired assumptions. Of course, from an empirical viewpoint, 
the two senses of this naturalization process are almost impossible to separate: 
analogy-making spirals up and down to make cultural abstractions nature-like. 
Moreover, the two senses of naturalization head in the same direction: both 
show that social forms and cultural constructs are closer to one another than the 
model of culture as an imaginative leap tends to suggest. For culture can also 
be seen from the angle of affordances, that is, the organization of attention. 
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Culture largely consists of attentional commonalities that mediatize the per-
ception, qualification and recognition of salience, define what information is 
relevant in which situation, and inhibit opportunities for action. Although per-
ceivers do identify, independently of the culture they belong to, the same 
informational basis in social affordances such as comforting, fighting or 
sharing, they consider certain kinds of relationship as more salient than others. 
The differential degree of salience that social objects are endowed with is then 
at the heart of the process of enculturation: it results from the “attention-
directing interactions” of attention holders, mainly caregivers, who lead the 
child to discover, in the layout of his or her environment, the culturally hierar-
chized scope of choices and sense of possibilities (Loveland, 1991). 
Individuals thus discover the cultural affordances of events, relationships and 
objects through the acquisition of information furnished by their environment, 
for instance that a given meat is taboo or that an intimate relationship is shame-
ful. From this ecological perspective, cultural competence is not a matter of 
decoding the meaning of a proposition, but a matter of singling out particular 
aspects of the environment for scrutiny and action and screening others as 
irrelevant (Windsor, 2004). Like physical objects, primitive social affordances 
can be culturally invested and transformed according to the kind of attentional 
focus they are subjected to. From merely recognizable gestalts, social affor-
dances can turn into cultural “good forms”, that is, valued objects of joint 
attention and social referencing. The fact that the grasp of something as an 
opportunity for action and the attention to some objects rather than others vary 
across cultures is particularly well demonstrated in the groundbreaking work of 
Richard Nisbett (Nisbett & al., 1999; Nisbett, 2004). In various experiments 
synthesized in Nisbett et al. (this volume), it was observed that Easterners give 
priority to relationship processing, background elements and holistic explana-
tions whereas Westerners focus on individual properties, mentalistic 
attributions and analytic thinking. Anthropology and cultural psychology have 
also shown that certain cultures are much more attendant to situational features 
than to various internal mental states, whether activated or dispositional, when 
explaining others’ behaviors (see Lillard, 1998, for reviews). A large amount 
of evidence thus shows cultural variation in the degree of salience of social 
affordances, such as relationships, situations or rules, and in the role that those 
affordances play in the prediction and explanation of behaviors.  
From this Gestaltic perspective, human beings are less organisms that 
acquire “cultural contents” through specific devices than perceptual systems 
that learn to “be affected” through the “education of attention” (Gibson, 1979, 
p. 254; Servais, this volume). As Zerubavel (1997) put it, optical enculturation 
teaches us how to “look” at things in a certain conventional way, which 
explains the relatively small number of optical deviants who dare to defy or 
ignore the optical norms of their social environments by maintaining a view of 
the world that is at odds with the one commonly shared by others around them 
and by thereby risking a cognitive – and social – excommunication. If we con-
sider culture as an attentional system that gives individuals the incentive to 
recognize some social affordances as worthy of being acted upon, it is no won-
der that natives “see” the analogical mappings that make sense of their society 
as a whole without being able to justify them. As building blocks of the par-
ticipative and quasi-perceptive world of culture, analogies are the bearers of 
socio-cultural relevance, not of ontological truth. 
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